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Article 3

STUDENT
ARTICLES
The Product Recall Process:
Mechanics and Shortcomings
Cassie Orban

I. Introduction
According to the statistics of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, each year one American in ten
will suffer an injury related to a consumer product. The
staggering estimate of 29.5 million injuries and 22,000
deaths per year leaves consumer advocates wholly dissatisfied with the current consumer protection laws.
Protection against defective consumer products
first gained statutory form in the Consumer Product
Safety Act of 1972. Through the Act, Congress created the
Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CSPC"), an
independent federal regulatory agency. Congress commissioned the CSPC to protect the public from unreasonable risks and injuries caused by consumer products.
Through its short history, the CPSC has led the charge in
consumer advocacy, battled governmental downsizing,
and recalled several thousands of products. Yet, the
efforts of the CPSC have not adequately protected consumers from the dangers that continue to leak into the
flow of consumer products.
This Note will address the recall process and
current efforts to amend the Consumer Product Safety
Act to give the CPSC more power to act on the behalf of
consumers. First, this Note will briefly consider
manufacturer's post-sale duties to warn, retrofit and
recall. Second, the Note will discuss the CPSC's involvement in the product recall process and the new program
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recently implemented to help streamline product recalls.
Further, this section will discuss the problems that the
CPSC currently encounters with defective product recalls
and the statutory limits placed on them.
Third, this Note will outline the 1999 House Bill
proposal to amend the Consumer Product Safety Act. The
"Daniel Keysar Memorial and Childhood Consumer
Product Safety Act of 1999" aims to improve the product
recall process and help alleviate budgetary and other
constraints on the CPSC. Finally, this Note will consider
the future of product recalls. Specifically, the impact of
the House proposal on the CPSC's ability to protect
consumers and limit manufacturers' rights to keep recall
information private.

II. Manufacturer's Post Sale Duties
Traditionally, the law of products liability has
centered on the manufacturer's duty at the time of the
product's sale or the condition of the product at the time
it enters the market. Increasingly, courts entertain lawsuits based on the manufacturers' duties toward the
purchaser after sale.' The seminal case concerning a
manufacturer's post-sale duty to warn of hazardous
products came out of the Michigan Supreme Court in
Comstock v. General Motors Corporation.2 In Comstock, the
court extended a manufacturer's duty to warn consumers even after the product has left the manufacturer's
control.' The court held that because General Motors
knew of the defective cylinders shortly after the products
had been placed into the stream of commerce and did
nothing to warn consumers, it was liable to the injured
party.4 The court further reasoned that if a duty to warn
of a known danger exists at point of sale,.., a like duty
to give prompt warning exists when a latent defect which
makes the product hazardous to life becomes known to
the manufacturer shortly after the product has been put
on the market.5
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Although Comstock remains the seminal case on
the post-sale duty to warn, it is a conservative approach
vis-A-vis subsequent cases that have vastly expanded the
duty.6 In Cover v. Cohen, the highest New York court held
that a manufacturer may be liable for failing to warn
consumers of dangers in the use of a product which came
to the manufacturer's attention post-sale through advancements in technology or through notice of accidents
involving the product. 7 In Cover, the plaintiff was seriously injured when the defendant's car suddenly accelerated and ran him over.8 The suit charged GM, the manufacturer, and Kinney Motors, the dealer that sold the car
to the defendant, with breach of a post-sale duty to warn,
among other claims.9 The jury ultimately found against
both the manufacturer and dealer even though the car
was found to be reasonably safe when initially produced. 10
The court in Cover expanded the Comstock view of
the post-sale duty to warn in three significant ways."
First, while Comstock concerned only manufacturers,
Cover also allowed an action to be brought against dealers involved in the transaction. 2 This expansion in the
chain of liability is significant considering the many
entities that handle consumer products before they reach
the general public. 3 Second, Comstock held that a manufacturer was liable for a product that was defective at the
time of sale. 4 Cover, on the other hand, intimates that a
manufacturer may be held liable for a product that was
reasonably safe at the point of sale but was subsequently
determined defective. 5 Third, the Comstock court found
significant the short time between the sale and realization
of the defect while Cover did not clearly limit the time in
which the manufacturer's duty expires. 6
While the post-sale duty to warn is clearly established along a wide spectrum of court requirements, the
post-sale duties to retrofit and recall are less recognized
and rarely successful. A "duty to retrofit" is basically a
"duty to upgrade" or a "duty to improve" a product and
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can apply to any product subject to evolutionary design. 7 Generally, a manufacturer will provide a safety
feature for the product at no cost to the consumer. This
duty creates a great burden on the manufacturer which
accounts for the rarity with which courts are willing to
impose it on the manufacturer. Accordingly, the duty to
retrofit has generally been limited to specialized markets
such as helicopters and airplanes. 8
Like the duty to retrofit, the duty to recall has yet
to gain wide acceptance in the courts. The notion of a
recall has become a common term meaning notification
of a defect combined with an offer to repair or refund.' 9
Several situations can trigger a product recall, including
accident reports or statistics, customer complaints, warranty claims, test results, repair rates or statistics, or field
reports.2" These factors, along with the probability of the
product failing, the potential severity of injury, the number of units in the stream of commerce and still in storage
or on the shelves of distributors, and the product's unit
cost, help determine if a recall is necessary.2
Most American courts reject the notion of a common law duty to recall. 22 Generally, these courts reason
that recall decisions are best left to administrative agencies and legislatures.' The courts are reluctant to impose
such a duty on manufacturers without the ability to
properly weigh the costs and benefits of such a massive
undertaking.24 Accordingly, the courts are much more
willing to allocate this type of inquiry to administrative
agencies such as the Consumer Products Safety Commission or the Food and Drug Administration. These types
of agencies are better equipped to deal with the "careful
analysis of predictive models and studious comparisons
to recalls of similar products" that are necessary in the
world of effective product recalls.25
Like American courts, the Restatement (Third) of
Torts has not recognized a common law duty to recall.26
In commentary, the writers realize the significant burden
that a common law duty to recall would place on a
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manufacturer. 27 "If every improvement in product safety
were to trigger a common-law duty to recall, manufacturers would face incalculable costs every time they sought
to make their product lines better and safer." 28 Further,
the Restatement agrees with most courts that governmental agencies are best equipped to gather adequate
data regarding the ramifications of product recalls.2 9
However, the Restatement does endorse a cause of
action concerning the liability of a seller or distributor for
harm caused by post-sale failure to recall a product.3"
One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise
distributing products is subject to liability for harm to
persons or property caused by the seller's failure to recall
a product after the time of sale or distribution if: (a)(1) a
statute or other governmental regulation specifically
requires the seller or distributor to recall the product; or
(2) the seller or distributor, in the absence of a recall
requirement under Subsection (1), undertakes to recall
the product; and (b) the seller or distributor fails to act as
a reasonable person in recalling the product.31
The Restatement's approach seems to be
commonsensical, yet ultimately fails to encourage voluntary manufacturer action. Logic and reason dictate that if
a manufacturer is directed by a federal agency to recall a
defective product, it should proceed as a reasonable
person would in the recall situation. Section 11(a)(1)
provides for this situation and seems to adequately
protect the consumer from a defective recall process.
However, by imposing liability for voluntary recalls,
Section 11 serves to discourage manufacturers from
taking this type of action on their own.32

III. The CPSC's Role in Product Recalls
Since the great majority of American courts have
left the job of product recalls to federal administrative
agencies, it is necessary to consider the history, current
working doctrine, and potential obstructions to consumer
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safety protection of these agencies. This Note considers
only the Consumer Protection Safety Commission though
there are several federal agencies that have the ability to
recall products.33
A. Creation of the CPSC
Congress created the Consumer Product Safety
Commission ("CPSC") in 1972 through the Consumer
Product Safety Act ("Act'). 4 The Act sets forth four
goals: (1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks
of injury associated with consumer products; (2) to assist
in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products; (3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer products and to minimize conflicting State and
local regulations; and (4) to promote research and investigation into the causes and prevention of product-related
deaths, illnesses, and injuries.35 In furtherance of these
goals, Congress gave the CPSC jurisdiction over about
15,000 types of consumer products and the ability to force
manufacturers to recall products that are deemed hazard36

ous.

Although considered for many years a "dormant
agency," the CPSC has recently moved into the public eye
with an aggressive new chairman, Ann Brown.3 7 Nominated in 1994 by President Clinton, Brown is one of three
current heads of the CPSC. 38 Brown has been at the
center of recent media attention and has made "keeping
kids safe" her number one priority.39 Accordingly, the
CPSC's current efforts focus especially on children's
products.4° In her recent testimony before the House
Appropriations Committee, Brown articulated the
Commission's two main focal points: (1) reducing the
product hazards to children and families and (2) identify41
ing and researching product hazards.
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B. Reporting Regulations
In order to encourage the widespread reporting of
potential product hazards and help the CPSC reach its
goals, Congress enacted several reporting requirements
for manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers of
consumer products. 42 Failure to report under these statutes may result in a penalty as high as $1.5 million.43
There are three different reporting schemes under the
CPSA: Section 15 Reports, Section 37 Reports, and Section 102 Reports. I will take each in turn.
1. Section 15(b) Reports
Under Section 15(b) of the CPSA, an entity must
notify the Commission immediately if it obtains information which reasonably supports the conclusion that a
product distributed in commerce (1) fails to meet a consumer product safety standard or banning regulation, (2)
contains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard to consumers, (3) creates an unreasonable risk
of serious injury or death, or (4) fails to comply with a
voluntary standard upon which the Commission has
relied under the CPSA. 4 The company must report this
information to the CPSC immediately, i.e., within 24
hours, of obtaining this type of information. 45
The Commission encourages these entities to
report any potential hazards, but allows the company a
reasonable time to determine if the hazard is one of
reportable quality.46 Any investigation should not last
more than ten days unless the company can demonstrate
that a longer time is reasonable under the circumstances.4 7 The Commission will evaluate whether or not
the company should have reported and when. Further,
the evaluation will be based on what the company knew
or should have known about the hazard. 48
When a company reports under Section 15(b), any
information given to the CPSC is considered confidential.
"Section 6(b)(5) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b)(5),
Volume 12, Number 4 2000
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prohibits the release of such information unless a remedial action plan has been accepted in writing, a complaint
has been issued or the reporting firm consents to the
release." 49 Companies also have an opportunity to claim
that the information falls into a class of trade secrets or
confidential commercial or financial information and
must be marked as so in compliance with the statute.50
2. Section 37 Reports
In addition to knowledge of a potential product
hazard, Congress imposed a duty on manufacturers to
report any litigation concerning their products.51 Manufacturers must submit a Section 37 report to the CPSC if
four criteria are met. First, a manufacturer must report if
a particular model of their product is the matter of at
least three civil actions filed in state or federal court.52
Second, a report must be made if each of these suits
alleges that the particular model caused the death or
grievous bodily harm to the consumer. 3 Third, during
one of CPSC specified periods of time, each of these three
actions ended in a settlement or a court judgment for the
plaintiff.54 Finally, the manufacturer must also be involved in the defense of the claim or have notice of each
action prior to any final judgment and be involved in
settling any duty owed to the plaintiff as a result of the
settlement or judgment.55
If a manufacturer deems that it fits all four requirements, it must submit a Section 37 report within 30
days after a judgment or final settlement in the last of
three lawsuits.'M Unlike the Section 15(b) reports, however, the information given to the CPSC in a Section 37
report is strictly confidential and cannot be publicized
under any circumstances.57 "By law, reporting under
section 37 is not an admission of the existence of an
unreasonable risk of injury, a defect, a substantial product hazard, an imminent hazard, or any other liability
under any statute or common law." "
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3. Section 102 Reports
Finally, Congress created a reporting requirement in
the Child Safety Protection Act that requires companies
to report certain choking incidents to the CPSC. 59 Any
manufacturer, distributor, retailer, or importer of marbles,
small balls, latex balloons or toys or games which contain
these types of materials are subject to Section 102 reports. ° Such an entity must make a Section 102 report if
it has information that (1) any child, regardless of age,
choked on such a product and (2) as a result of the incident, the child died, suffered serious injury; ceased
breathing, or was treated by a medical care professional.6'
Companies in such a position must report the information to the CPSC within 24 hours of obtaining it.
Section 6(b)(5) accords the Section 102 reports the same
confidentiality as Section 15 reports. That is, the CPSC
may only disseminate information that has been consented to by the parties involved, where a formal complaint against the company has been issued, or a reme62
dial action plan has been accepted in writing.
C. Evaluating Reporting Regulations and Instituting
Recall Procedures
In order to attain the goals set forth in the Consumer
Product Safety Act, i.e., protect the public from dangerous products, one of the most effective tools that Congress granted the CPSC was the ability to require a
manufacturer to recall a product.63 If the CPSC determines that a product presents a substantial hazard to the
public, it may require the manufacturer, distributor, or
retailer to take corrective action.' Depending on the
hazard that the product poses to the public, the CPSC
will determine the necessary action.
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1. The TraditionalRecall Process
Before the huge undertaking of a recall takes place,
the Commission must make what it calls a preliminary
determination ("PD") that the product is substantially
hazardous." This process involves the CPSC staff's
technical evaluation of the product. 66 The evaluation
itself could take several months to complete.67 After a PD
is made, the Commission then enters into negotiations
with the company.68 Negotiations cover a wide range of
topics, from the length of a recall campaign to the aesthetics of the posters used to make the public aware of
the defective product.6 9 The negotiations can take a
substantial amount of time and can easily be prolonged
by companies who are less than willing to comply with
CPSC guidelines." PD and negotiations under the traditional process usually average 81 business days before
the Commission gives final approval to go ahead with
the recall. 7'
For years the CPSC's traditional recall process was
criticized for its lack of effective recalls, amount of bureaucratic tape, and general inability to alert consumers
in a timely fashion.72 Many companies did not report
potentially dangerous products for fear that the
Commission's recall process would slow down their own
recall efforts and subject them to liability.73 Further,
companies wanted to avoid the stigma of manufacturing
a product that the government had formally considered
substantially dangerous.74 Therefore, many manufacturers declined to cooperate with the traditional process
making the Commission's efforts to work with industry
and protect consumers much more difficult.75
2. The Fast-TrackProgram
In response to public and industry concerns over
the flaws of the traditional recall process, the CPSC
instituted a new program called the Fast-Track Recall

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Volume 12, Number 4 2000

Process.76 The program was officially instituted on a
permanent basis in 1997 after a very successful run as a
pilot program.' Unlike the traditional recall process,
fast-track eliminates the process of preliminary determination ("PD"). 78 The elimination of the PD allows companies to lessen their risk of liability by moving more
quickly with a recall.7 9
The fast-track program is designed for companies
willing and able to move quickly with a voluntary recall. 80 Fast-track eliminates months of technical determinations and allows the necessary information to move
quickly to consumers.8 After an initial report made to
the CPSC, fast-track requires a company to propose a
recall plan within 20 days.82 If the Commission accepts
the plan, the company is allowed to move ahead with the
recall activity without being subject to a PD. Currently,
companies are moving so quickly that a fast-track recall
takes an average of nine days from initial report of a
83
problem to initiation of the recall activity.
Both industry and consumer advocates have
praised the new fast-track program. Companies like the
program because it allows them to be "in-and-out" in 20
business days. 4 Further, the speed of the program lessens the time that consumers are exposed to dangerous
products therefore lowering the liability for companies.
Several companies have used the fast-track process
8
repeatedly because it is so cost-effective and speedy.
Likewise, consumer advocates recognize the
effectiveness of the fast-track program. The program has
increased the rate of returned products from 30% under
the traditional process to almost 60% under fast-track.86
In fact, the fast-track program won the 1998 Innovations
in Government Award.87 The program was one of three
federal programs honored based on four selection criteria: the program's novelty, effectiveness, solution to a
significant problem, and replicability by other government entities.88
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D. Obstacles to Greater Consumer Protection
Although the fast-track program has dramatically
increased the amount of recalled products, the CPSC
continues to encounter obstacles to fully protecting the
public from dangerous products. First, the CPSC has no
budget for researching products to determine if they may
be hazardous. Second, the CPSC lacks adequate funding
vis-A-vis inflation and the boom of consumer products on
the modem market. Finally, the Commission is silenced
by Section 6(b) of the CPSA. This provision forbids the
Commission to release any documents pertaining to
potentially hazardous products for a significant period of
time while consumers are unaware of possible harm.
1. Lack of Research Budget
Congress created in the CPSC a duty to "conduct
research, studies, and investigations on the safety of
consumer products and on improving the safety of such
products."89 Although Congress clearly envisioned the
Commission to conduct such research, the CPSC has no
budget to undertake such a project.90 The heads of the
CPSC find the lack of research funding to be one of the
greatest obstacles to protecting the public from hazardous products. 9' In his testimony before Congress, Vice
Chairman Moore reiterated to the House that the CPSC
needs "the ability to research significant customer product safety problems that require substantial technical
effort and expertise to adequately understand."92
Further, the general public is unaware that the
government does very little research on products. A
survey done in 1999 by the Coalition for Consumer
Rights showed that two of three voters mistakenly believe that children's products are tested by the government for safety.93 In addition, four out of five interviewed
believe that manufacturers are required to test their
products before release when in fact, the general public
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often provides the testing.94 With a research budget, the
CPSC could remove injurious products from shelves
before consumers are exposed to dangers. A research
program would better protect the consumer and help to
lessen industry's liability exposure.
2. A Budget That is Half of What it Should Be.
When Congress created the CPSC in 1974, it allocated $30 million to the Commission.95 If Congress had
kept up with inflation, the budget of the CPSC would be
$98 million today, compared to a 1999 allocation of a
mere $47 million.96 Furthermore, the "Commission's staff
of 480 is half of what it was nearly two decades ago and
one-eighteenth of the Food and Drug Administration. 97
Although the duties of the CPSC have grown tremendously, the nation's investment into product safety has
not kept up.9
In 1999, the CPSC requested a budget for the fiscal
year 2000 of $50.5 million, a modest $3.5 million increase
over the 1999 allocation. 99 This request included a sizable
projection for many research initiatives. 100 However,
Congress denied the request and approved a budget of
only $49 million. 1 1 Therefore, the Commission was
forced to downsize its original projects, notably the
Hazard Research and Integrated Database and other
major research endeavors. 2 Although Chairman Ann
Brown feels that the lack of resources isn't inhibiting the
Commission's crucial work, more money would certainly
make policing manufacturers and protecting consumers
much easier and more effective. 03
3. The Silence Clause of 6(b)
While Congress gave the CPSC a number of powers, it did restrict the extent to which the Commission
may disseminate information about products.' ° As
discussed in Section B, supra, Section 6(b) of the CPSA
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requires the CPSC to allow the manufacturer to preview
and restrict any information bound for public
scrutiny.10 5 The Commission must give the manufacturer 30
days to comment on the release. 6 Further, 6(b) requires
the Commission to take reasonable steps to assure the
accuracy of the information, that the disclosure is fair
under the circumstances, and that the information is reasonably related to carrying out a legitimate purpose under
the Act.10 7 Products that the Commission has set forth to
declare imminently hazardous or which it believes are in
violation of the prohibited acts section of the CPSA are
excepted from this privilege. 8
While to some extent industry and fairness require
that the CPSC allow manufacturers to preview requested
information, the processing time can be substantial and
may potentially keep consumers unaware of dangerous
products. Chairman Brown complains that "6b ... is the
bane of [the CPSC's] existence. " " The provision gives
industry the control over information which Brown believes belongs to the consumer."0 However, Commissioner
Mary Sheila Gall defends the provision citing fairness and
accuracy of the information before it is released.'
In CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., the Supreme Court
held that even the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")
does not require the 6(b) information to be disclosed. 2
Although a discussion of the decision in GTE is out of the
scope of this Note, its effect on the restriction of information flow to the public is important. After GTE, the ability
to gain information about potentially hazardous products
now involves expanded proportions and requires many
more staff members approval, significantly slowing down
FOIA requests." 3

IV. The "Daniel Keysar Memorial and Childhood Consumer Product Safety Act of 1999"
In response to the many obstacles that the CPSC
faces to effectuating its goals, Representative Rod
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Blagojevich (D- Ill.) and others have introduced H.R.
3208, the Daniel Keysar Memorial and Childhood Consumer Product Safety Act of 1999.11 The bill seeks to
amend the CPSA to improve the ability of the CPSC to
reach consumers about hazardous products by (1) promulgating recall information in a more comprehensive
manner, (2) lifting some 6(b) restrictions, (3) creating a
system by which consumers of children's products can be
easily identified in the event of a recall (4) requiring the
CPSC to report to Congress annually on the effectiveness
of recalls and (5) doubling the CPSC's annual budget."'
First, the bill requires the CPSC to establish a
comprehensive list of all recalled children's products
over the last 15 years and distribute it to a wide variety of
entities."6 The CPSC must take pains to make the list
available to the general public, state and local governments, and the secondary children's market including
retail stores and child care facilities. Furthermore, H.R.
3208 requires the Commission to develop a strategy for
partnering with state and local governments to produce
118
and distribute the list.
Second, the bill attacks Section 6(b) and loosens
the CPSC's restraints on disseminating information
thereunder.19 H.R. 3208 states that 6(b) shall not apply to
the announcement of corrective actions.120 The announcements shall, with respect to the product for which the
announcements are made - - (1) state clearly and concisely, in the strongest possible language, the nature and
extent of the product hazard and any potential risk of
injury; and (2) shall include the number of known deaths,
injuries and incidents associated with the product hazard
being corrected.121 Furthermore, the Commission must
proceed in a timely fashion and announce recalls in a
manner that will induce consumers to participate. 122
Third, H.R. 3208 requires the Commission to
create a pilot program to work with manufacturers and
retailers to obtain the identity of consumers in the event
of a recall. 23 In addition, the bill mandates the Commis-
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sion to report annually on the effectiveness of recalls.'24
This requirement seeks to create statistics on the number
of products recalled or repaired.25 Further, the Commission must make these statistics available to the general
public through its toll free telephone hotline, electronic
mail, and website. 126
Finally, the bill addresses the Commission's lack of
sufficient funds by doubling their budget. 127 "The first
sentence of section 32(a) of the Consumer Product Safety
Act (15 U.S.C.A. 2081) is amended by striking out 'not to
exceed' and all that follows and inserting '$100 million
for each of the fiscal years 2001, 2002, and 2003. ' "128
V. Analysis
In light of the three major obstacles that the CPSC
faces - lack of research budget, insufficient funding in
general, and the inability to disseminate important information - the proposed bill properly alleviates these
problems. By doubling the budget of the CPSC, the bill
addresses the first two issues holding the Commission
back from fulfilling its goal to protect consumers. As
modem society evolves, the amount of consumer products that circulate in commerce grows exponentially. The
public cannot expect the CPSC to properly protect it from
hazardous products without paying the price in funding.
Most Americans would agree that saving lives is money
well spent. 29 Inflation as well as growth in industry
dictates that the budget of the Commission must increase
along with the demands placed upon it.
Furthermore, easing the restrictions upon the
CPSC vis-A-vis information subject to section 6(b) allows
for consumers and industry to move more quickly with
recalls. Permitting the CPSC to announce recalls without
the prior approval of manufacturers allows the information about hazardous products to reach consumers faster
and lessens the likelihood of injuries. Likewise, the easing up of 6(b) standards benefits manufacturers. If haz-
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ardous products are caught while still on the shelves, the
manufacturer is exposed to less liability and will have to
replace or refund fewer products. Although 6(b) originated from fear that the CPSC will erroneously announce
product defects, H.R. 3208 deals with the recall notices or
correction actions which the CPSC initiates only after
negotiations with the manufacturer. 130 Therefore, the
manufacturer already has had substantial contact with
the Commission and can be assured that the information
disseminated is accurate.
Lastly, the bill addresses the clear need for
children's products to be tracked more aggressively. The
majority of hazardous products recalled are children's
products or toys.' 3 ' In fact, 38 million individual units of
children's products were recalled in 1998 alone. 32 The
bill calls for the Commission to develop a procedure
whereby the consumer is easily identified by the manufacturer in the case of a recall. Although this process may
be difficult to maintain and puts a burden on the manufacturer, a death rate from consumer products of 22,000
annually, clearly demonstrates that current measures are
not adequate. 33

VI. Conclusion
As the market for consumer products grows, so do
the post-sale duties of manufacturers and the work of
federal administrative agencies. Good government works
toward not only protecting the public but also creating an
alliance with industry to effectuate that goal. The CPSC
has had some success within the current framework of
the CPSA, but needs more resources and legislative
intervention to fully realize its purpose of protecting the
American people from hazardous consumer products.
The Daniel Keysar Memorial Childhood Consumer
Product Safety Act focuses on children, the most vulnerable consumers in the country. This amendment deserves
the full support of Congress and the President.
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product even if defective when it left the manufacturer's
control); Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849
E2d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law)
(court held that manufacturer was not negligent as a
matter of law for failing to retrofit allegedly defective
aerial bucket lift); Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg.
Co., 253 Kan. 741, 861 P.2d 1299, 1315 (1993) (court recognized a post-sale duty to warn but held that "product
recalls are properly the business of administrative agencies as suggested by federal statutes"); Lynch v. McStome
and Lincoln Plaza Assocs., 548 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (court leaves open the question of whether a
manufacturer has a post-sale duty to warn of hazards
that present a clear threat to the safety of the users but
holds that there is no duty to retrofit or to inform users of
new safety improvements). But see Downing v. Overhead
Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Colo. App. 1985) (when
product is defective at time of sale, the manufacturer has
a duty "either to remedy such defects, or if a complete
remedy is not feasible, to give users adequate instructions concerning methods for minimizing danger");
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451
(2d Cir. 1969) (suggesting that a manufacturer has a duty
to remedy defects that are not discovered until after the
product is sold)."
23 See Richmond, supra note 1, at 65.
24 See id.
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25. Id.
26. See
(1997).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §

11

27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Richmond, supra note 1, at 80. Richmond criticizes
the Restatement's § 11 concerning voluntary recalls. "The
assumed duty rule announced in Section 11 is unfair and
makes for bad policy."
33. For example, cars, trucks and motorcycles are covered
by the Department of Transportation; foods, drugs and
cosmetics are covered by the Food and Drug Administration; and alcohol, tobacco and firearms are within the
jurisdiction of the Department of the Treasury.
34. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2501-2084 (1974)(approved 1999).
35. Id. § 2501.
36. See The Official Website of the CPSC. (visited March 21,
2000) <http://www.cpsc.gov / cpscpub/pubs/103.htm>.
37. See PlayingIt Safe: Interview with Ann Brown, 31-Oct
Trial 20 (1998) [hereinafter, Trial].
38. The two other heads of the department are Commissioner Mary Sheila Gall, nominated by President Bush
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and Vice Chairman Thomas Moore, nominated by President Clinton.
39. See Trial, supra note 28, at 20.
40. See FY 2000 House Appropriations Subcommittee Testimony: Submitted Before the VA, HUD, and Independent
Agencies Committee, 106th Cong. (1999)<http: / /
www.cpsc.gov/test/2000.htm>[hereinafter, Brown Testimony]. Brown also reiterated the eight strategic goals of
the Commission: "Reduce the head injury rate to children
from consumer products by 15%; Prevent any increase in
the death rate from poisonings to children; Reduce the
death rate from fires by 10%; Reduce the rate from carbon
monoxide poisonings by 20%; Reduce the death rate
from electrocutions by 20%; Increase public contacts
through the Worldwide Web by 500% and through the
Consumer Product Safety Review by 200%. Maintain
capability to handle 250,000 Hotline calls annually; Attain
85% success with services CPSC provides industry
through the Fast Track Recall Program, and 80% success
in the Ombudsman Program; Sustain the current satisfaction of consumers with the CPSC's Hotline and Clearing
House, and sustain the states' satisfaction with CPSC's
State Partners Program at 90% or better."
41. See id.
42. See Recall Handbook (Revised 1999) <http://
www.cpsc.gov/businfo/8002.html>[hereinafter, Handbook].
43. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2069. The Commission assessed its
largest penalty ever ($1.5million) against Cadet Manufacturing of Vancouver, Washington. The company failed to
report defective heaters to the CPSC. For further information on the settlement see ConsolidatedElectricalDistributors Inc., 64 Fed. Reg. 43,990 (1999).
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44. Handbook, supra note 42, at 4.
45. See id. at 8.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 6.
49. Id.
50. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2055(a)(3).
51. See Handbook, supra note 42, at 6.
52. See id.
53. See id. Specifically, if the product caused mutilation or
disfigurement, dismemberment or amputation, the loss
of important bodily functions or debilitating internal
disorder, injuries likely to require extended hospitalization, severe burns, severe electric shock, or other injuries
of similar severity.
54. See id. The CPSC specifies each two-year period starting in 1991. The periods are as follows: January 1, 1991December 31, 1992; January 1, 1993- December 31, 1994;
January 1, 1995- December 31, 1996; January 1, 1997December 31, 1998; January 1, 1999-December 31, 2000;
subsequent periods repeat pattern.
55. See id. at 7.
56. See id.
57. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2055(a)(3).
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58. Handbook, supra note 42, at 7.
59. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1278.
60. See id.
61. See Handbook, supra note 42, at 8.
62. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2055(b)(5).
63. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064(d).
64. See id.
65. See THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY REVIEW, Vol.3, No. 1,
at 3 (Fall 1998)(also available on-line <http:/ /
www.cpsc.gov/businfo/compli.html>). "Substantially
dangerous" is defined in the CPSA in 15 U.S.C.A. § 2064.
Substantially dangerous means "(1) a failure to comply
with an applicable consumer product safety rule which
creates a substantial risk of injury to the public, or (2) a
product defect which (because of the pattern of defect,
the number of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a
substantial risk of injury to the public."
66. See id. at 1.
67. See id.
68. See Mitch Lipka, Defects in the Nation's Product Recall
System Are PuttingConsumers in Jeopardy,SUNSENTINEL FT. LAUDERDALE, Nov. 28, 1999. at 1A. (First of a
Three-Part Series)(hereinafter, Lipka 1).
69. See Handbook, supra note 42, at 12-14.
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70. See Lipka 1, supra note 67.
71. See id.
72. See id.

73. See THE

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY REVIEW,

supra note 65,

at 2.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Conditions Under Which the Staff Will Refrain
From Making Preliminary Hazard Determinations, 62
Fed. Reg. 39,827 (1997).
78. See id.

79. See THE

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY REVIEW,

supra note 65,

at 1.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 3.
82. See id. at 2.
83. See id. at 3.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See Lipka 1, supra note 67.
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87. See Brown Testimony, supra note 40. The CPSC was
also honored by the Institute for Dispute Resolution for
their innovative use of mediation in carrying out a recall
of defective high temperature plastic vent pipes.
88. See THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY REVIEW, supra note 65,
at 1. The Innovations Award is funded by the Ford Foundation and administered by the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in partnership with the
Council for Excellence in Government.
89. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2054(b)(1).
90. See Brown Testimony, supra note 40.
91. See FY 2000 House AppropriationsSubcommittee Testimony: Submitted Before the VA, HUD, and Independent
Agencies Committee, 106th Cong. (1999)(Testimony of
Thomas H. Moore)Ihereinafter Moore Testimony].
92. See id.
93. See Lipka 1, supra note 67.
94. See id.
95. See HR 3208, 106th Cong. (1999).
96. See id.
97. See Lipka 1, supra note 67.
98. See id.
99. See Moore Testimony, supra note 90.
100. See id.
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101. See OperatingPlan 2000 -Budget Reductions Force Cuts
in Projects <htttp:www.consumeralert.org/pubs/monitor/1999/Nov99.htm>.
102. See id.
103. See Mitch Lipka, Law Requires Agency to Keep Data
Secret Companies Must Sign off on Whatever Information is
Released to the Public,SUN-SENTINEL FT. LAUDERDALE, November 30, 1999. at 15A. [hereinafter, Lipka 21.
104. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 2055(b)(1).
105. See Frances E. Zollers, The implementation of the Consumer Product Safety Act Section 6(b) and the Conflict with
the Freedom of Information Act Policies, 39 ADMN. L. REV. 61,
63. (1987) [hereinafter, Zollers].
106. See id. at 65.
107. See id. at 63.
108. See id.
109. See Lipka 2, supra note 102.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980).
113. See Zollers, supra note 104, at 65.
114. See HR 3208, 106th Cong. (1999). Blagojevich proposed
the bill in memorandum of Daniel Keysar, a 16 month
child who was killed by the collapse of a defective crib.
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The Chicago boy was in a licensed day care in Lincoln
Park that had been inspected just 8 days before the incident. The crib had been recalled by the CPSC in 1993 but
the day care facility had not known of the recall. Danny
was the 12th child to die in this type of defective crib.
Three months later a 13th child died in Fair Haven, NJ in
the same type of crib.
115. See id.
116. See H.R. 3208(a).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See H.R. 3208(b).
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See H.R. 3208(c).
124. See H.R. 3208(d).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See H.R. 3208. Section 4. Authorization of Appropriations.
128. Id.
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129. See Brown Testimony, supra note 40. Chairman
Brown estimates that the cost of deaths, injuries and
property damage caused by hazardous products to be
approximately $400 billion annually.
130. See generally, Lipka 2, supra note 102.
131. See H.R. 3208(5).
132. See H.R. 3208(6).
133. See Lipka 2, supra note 102.
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